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"Every sweet has its sour; every evil its good."
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
I. INTRODUCTION
When Robert Louis Stevenson created the characters of Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde, he wrote of two characters residing in one body.' One was a good doctor,
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May, 2006; B.A., Public
Health, Natural Science Option, Johns Hopkins University, January 2003. Many thanks to my parents, Norena
and George, who, having survived this year with me, are now WTO experts in their own right. Thanks to my
wonderful faculty advisor, Professor Marjorie Florestal, for showing me how to look at the broader impact of a
seemingly "small" issue. Thanks to my many editors for their infinite skills that helped me develop this
Comment from an idea into something real. And lastly, thanks to all my friends who continued to speak to me
even when my vocabulary was wholly comprised of acronyms.
1. See generally ROBERT Louis STEVENSON, THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE
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the other an evil murderer. Stevenson used this duality to describe the nature of
man; but this duality is also reflected in man's technology. Just as the nature of
man is both evil and good, dual-use technology can serve both evil and good
purposes.' The evil lies in "military and other strategic uses (e.g. nuclear)," while
the good lies in nonviolent "civil applications. 4  Due to its possible evil
applications, transferring dual-use technology to nations that threaten its peace
and security has long troubled the United States. 5
The main U.S. export control over dual-use technology is the Export
Administration Act of 1979 ("EAA").6 The EAA sets out the Export
Administration Regulations,7 which provide guidelines for whether American
exporters of dual-use technologies receive a general or a far more complicated
validated license to export the goods.' The license an exporter receives is
determined by the end user identity and use 9 of the technology, which affects the
difficulty of exporting the item.' ° The EAA expired in 1990, but has since been
extended indefinitely through executive orders to preclude foreign parties from
posing a grave threat to U.S. economic and national safety.'
In addition to the internal controls of the EAA, the United States is subject to
external export controls as a result of its membership in the World Trade
(Penguin Books 2003) (1886).
2. See Richard Re, Playstation2 Detonation: Controlling the Threat of Dual-Use Technologies, HARV.
INT'L REV. 46, 46 (Fall 2003) (defining dual-use technologies as "commercial products designed for peaceful
employment but potentially adaptable to military ends" and also providing examples such as "golf clubs,
pacemakers, and shampoos for use in missile, nuclear, and chemical weapons programs, respectively.").
3. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 206 (2001) (providing that "[elxamples of dual-use goods and services
include computers, navigation and avionics, machine tools, and transfers of dual-use product
informaion/technology.").
4. See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (1996) (noting that "the term dual-use serves to distinguish [Export
Administration Regulations]-controlled items that can be used both in military and other strategic uses and in
civil applications from those that are weapons and military related use or design and subject to the controls of
the Department of State or subject to the nuclear related controls of the Department of Energy or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission").
5. See Jamil Jaffer, Development, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L.
519, 520 (2002) (citing the United States' concern with increasing transfer of dual-use technology as its impetus
to agree to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies in July 1996).
6. EAA of 1979, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West 1979).
7. Export Administration Regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 730.2 (2004) [hereinafter EAR].
8. EAA of 1979, app. § 2403. The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains the Commerce Control List
("CCL"), which lists all items subject to the Department's export controls. See EAR, supra note 7, § 744
(providing that "[t]he Commerce Control List (CCL)... includes all items (commodities, software, and
technical data subject to [Bureau of Export Administration] export controls").
9. In this comment, the term "end user" refers to the final holder of the technology and the term "end
use" refers to the final, actual use to which the technology is put.
10. EAA of 1979, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2403 (West 1979) (requiring additional supporting documentation
and further authorization for exports requiring an individual validated license).
11. Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (Aug. 19, 1994).
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Organization ("WTO").' 2 The WTO replaced and incorporated the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),'3 which requires that its members
treat other member trading partners equally. If a member state grants another
member a special favor, it has to do the same for all other WTO members. This
non-discrimination principle is referred to as "most-favoured-nation" treatment
because each member of the WTO must treat all other members equally.'
4
In some situations, GATT allows for a member to derogate, or be excepted,
from the "most-favoured-nation" principle." One such exception is a security
exception. 6 Under Article XXI of GATT, a contracting member of the WTO can
legitimately restrict trade without violating GATT, to protect its "essential
security interests" or to comply with the United Nations ("UN") Charter.
7
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ("9/11"),'" some legal
experts objected to EAA restrictions on exports for reasons other than protecting
the "essential security interests" of the United States, including efforts to avoid
proliferating weaponry and to influencing domestic policies of foreign nations. 9
This comment argues that the terrorist attacks on the United States shifted the
national conception of "essential security interests." While eliminating
international terrorism was once solely a foreign policy interest, today it has
evolved into an American national security interest. Many publicized targets of
U.S. anti-terrorism actions are not members of the WTO, and, therefore, the U.S.
12. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144
(1994) [hereinafter Final Act] (providing that "[t]he WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for
the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.") The United States is an original member of the WTO.
Id. at 1130-1131.
13. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 11 (3d ed. 2003), at http://www.wto.
org/English/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Understanding the
WTO]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
14. See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13 (explaining the obligations accompanying GATT Article
I).
15. See GATT, supra note 13, at Art. XX - XXI (listing the general exceptions and the security
exception to the "most-favoured-nation" principle).
16. GAIT, supra note 13, at Art. XXI.
17. Id. at Art. XXI (b)-(c). The security exception allows derogation from all WTO obligations, not just
from Article I requirements. Id.
18. Referring to the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001. See Kelly
Pate, President Designates Today a Day of Prayer, Remembrance, DENVER POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at Al
(describing the attacks as comprised of two planes crashing into the World Trade Center in New York City,
which then collapsed, a plane crashing in Pennsylvania and a plane crashing into the Pentagon in Washington,
D.C.).
19. See Michael Gaugh, GATT Article XXI and U.S. Export Controls: The Invalidity of Nonessential
Non-Proliferation Controls, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51, 73-74 (1995) (arguing that the EAA does not conform to
GATT because: (1) there are no findings that export controls are necessary to protect essential security interests;
(2) most proliferation controls are categorized as foreign policy controls, not national security controls; and (3)
even the Department of Commerce knows how to note that a given technology is controlled for both reasons it
has failed to so in a number of proliferation controls).
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has no duty to afford them "most-favoured-nation" protections under GATT. 0
However, there are a number of WTO member countries who are considered to
harbor terrorists, from whom the United States restricts exports of harmful dual-
use technologies. 2' This paper addresses the legality and advisability of controls
on exports of dual-use technologies to such countries.
Part II discusses the historical background of the U.S. export controls and
sets out the structure of current controls on the export of dual-use technology.
Part III traces the development of GATT, its foundation of non-discrimination in
trade, and its Article XXI security exception. Part IV considers whether the EAA
violates GATT in light of the United States' current "War on Terror." Part V
identifies efficacy and economic implications of the EAA. Finally, Part VI
concludes that in light of post-9/11 security concerns, the United States has not
violated the WTO's "most-favoured-nation" principle because the EAA properly
falls within GATT's Article XXI security exception, due to the increased threat
of international terrorism aimed at the United States. However, unless the EAA is
made more effective, it might not adequately serve a national security purpose,
nor justify the competitive disadvantage at which it places U.S. businesses.
II. U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS ON DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY
A. History
For almost 100 years, U.S. export controls have protected national security
interests.22 The start of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union created a security threat, requiring a new peacetime export control
system.23 Congress responded to this new threat by enacting the Export Control
Act of 1949 ("1949 Act"),24 allowing for three types of controls on exports. The
first export control was the short-supply control, which was "to be used to
prevent the export of scarce goods that would have a deleterious impact on U.S.
industry and national economic performance., 25 The second control, the foreign
policy control, was "to be used by the President to promote the foreign policy of
20. See Understanding the WTO, supra note 13 (stating that Afghanistan, Iraq, and North Korea are not
members of the WTO, but Kenya and Pakistan are members).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 134-135.
22. See IAN F. FERGUSSON, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND
DEBATE CRS-2 (Congressional Research Service 2003) (noting that "during the first half of the 20th century,
war, or the imminent threat of war," led to export controls where "the rationale for control was the necessity of
not giving aid and comfort to the nation's enemies").
23. See Wikipedia, Cold War, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ColdWar (last visited Nov. 11, 2004)
(providing a general background on the Cold War between the Eastern and Western bloc countries and the
concern of nuclear weapons).
24. See FERGUSSON, supra note 22 (discussing the Export Control Act of 1949, which is no longer in
print).
25. Id.
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the United States."26 The third type of control, the national security control, was
"to be used to restrict the export of goods and technology.., that would make a
significant contribution to the military capability of any country that posed a
threat to the national security of the United States. 27 As the Cold War continued,
the 1949 Act was renewed seven times, each time largely without amendment,
and remained in effect until 1969.28
At the same time that Congress was enacting the 1949 Act, the United States
and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") allies were establishing the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls ("CoCom").
29 CoCom
served as a multilateral export control regime aimed at controlling the export of
"strategic goods and technology to the Soviet Union and its allies."3° It operated
by informal agreements among its members according to the rule of unanimity.
3'
CoCom developed a list of items with potential military uses for which all
members agreed to restrict export.3 2 Member states that wanted to export one of
these items to non-CoCom members had to submit the export application to
CoCom for review and approval.3" This provided a veto mechanism through
which one CoCom member could absolutely prohibit another member from
exporting technology to a non-member state.' 4 The CoCom restrictions over dual-
use technology exports were broad, but acceptable to U.S. businesses because of
their competitive supremacy in the 1950's technology field.33
In the late 1960s, the hostility between the United States and Soviet Union
relaxed, resulting in reduced export control regulations.36 The near-embargo
nature of the 1949 Act was replaced by less restrictive export controls of the
Export Administration Act of 1969 ("EAA of 1969"). 37 This shift to less
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. (noting that the Act was renewed in 1951, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, and 1965).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 812 n. 5 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (listing the members of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls as
including the member states of NATO, except Iceland, and Japan).
30. Id.
31. See Gist: U.S. Export Controls, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, Aug. 1992 (on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (noting that CoCom was "not based on a treaty or an executive agreement" and was
"implemented by each member country on a national basis" and explaining CoCom's mode of operations).
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. Jaffer, supra note 5, at 521.
35. See Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on Technology
Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L 441, 451-452 (2003) (noting that "[i]f U.S.
exporters were restricted from selling a particular technology to a designated region, it was quite unlikely that
another country, particularly a non-COCOM country, was in a position to supply the technology").
36. See FERGUSSON, supra note 22 (Congressional Research Service 2003) (illustrating how the growing
importance of trade to the U.S. economy and allies caused a reexamination of the export controls). This
reexamination was due to the decreasing need to restrict trade with the Soviet Union. Id.
37. Id. at CRS-3.
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restrictive controls was sustained by the renewal of the EAA in 1974 and 1977.38
The current EAA was finally passed by Congress in 1979, and it is this
legislation that forms the basis of the entire U.S. export control system today. 9
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the end of the Cold War, and the growth
of technology worldwide, political demand for liberalized export controls
resurfaced.40 U.S. businesses pressured policymakers to decrease restrictions on
the export of dual-use goods, due to less need to protect the United States from
Soviet attack and increased worldwide competition in the technology field."'
CoCom dissolved in 1994 as proposed by the Clinton administration, and was
replaced in 1997 by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies ("Wassenaar
Arrangement").42 Unlike CoCom, which required members to submit export
licenses of restricted items for review and approval by CoCom, the Wassenaar
Arrangement allowed member countries to independently determine whether to
export restricted goods or technology.43 Critics have argued that allowing
members to have complete discretion diminishes control over the export of dual-
use technology to rogue or unreliable nations.4
Domestically, Congress has not been able to reach an agreement on how to
reform the EAA even though such measures have been regularly introduced.45
The EAA was extended from 1989 to 1994 by temporary statutory extensions.
46
In 1994, former President George Bush invoked the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA")47 and issued Executive Order No. 12924 to
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Corr, supra note 35, at 452-455.
41. See id. (noting that the United States faced growing international competition, putting U.S.
companies at a serious disadvantage because restricted goods were available from non-U.S. and non-CoCom
sources).
42. See Mark D. Gursky, Comment, Liberalization of High Performance Computer Export Controls
Under the Clinton Administration: Balancing National Security and Economic Interests, 49 CATH. U.L. REV.
975, 993 (2000) (explaining that in order to liberalize national export laws, the Clinton Administration wanted
to replace CoCom with "a successor multilateral export control regime more oriented with the post Cold-War
environment").
43. Id. at 994.
44. See Corr, supra note 35, at 455-456 (noting that members tend not to comply with "these watered
down" requirements and that the U.S. can no longer prevent its allies or other countries from transferring
technology to countries the U.S. views "as unreliable or as strategic threats"); see also Gursky, supra note 42, at
994 (noting that critics argue that the Wassenaar Arrangement "removes the 'teeth' that CoCom exemplified in
controlling dual-use exports").
45. FERGUSSON, supra note 22, at CRS-3.
46. Id.
47. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994); see also Themes Karalis, Foreign Policy and Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence: Executive Orders Regarding Export Administration Act Extension in Times of Lapse as a
Political Question, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 125-126 (2004) (noting that "Congress expressly
authorized the President to use Title I of the IEEPA to continue the effectiveness of the EAA's Export
Administration Regulations"). Further, the President can "exercise this authority only in the face of an 'unusual
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside of the United States, to the
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continue the EAA for another six years.8 When that time period expired, the
EAA was extended from November 13, 2000 to August 20, 2001 through
legislation passed by both the House and Senate, and signed by the President.
4 9
Since August 20, 2001, the EAA has been operating due to Executive Order
13222, issued by former U.S. President Bill Clinton under International
Emergency Economic Powers Act provisions" President Clinton justified
extending the EAA on a determination that foreign parties having unrestricted
access to certain U.S. technologies constituted "an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States. ..".
B. Structure of the Export Administration Ac ("EAA")
The EAA is implemented through the Export Administration Regulations
("EAR").52 The EAR control U.S. origin commodities, software, and technology
for national security, foreign policy and short-supply reasons. 3 The EAR is
administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security, formerly known as the
Bureau of Export Administration, which is part of the U.S. Department of
Commerce.5 4 The Bureau of Industry and Security controls dual-use technology
and administers a list of dual-use items that are subject to licensing under the
EAR.55 This list is known as the Commerce Control List ("CCL").56
Obtaining a license to export dual-use goods is a complicated process. U.S.
exporters must first refer to the CCL 7 to obtain an Export Control Classification
Number for their proposed export. Next, they must reference the Commerce
Country Chart58 to determine whether exports are generally permitted to the
destination country.59 Numerous exceptions may apply which deny exportation,
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States..."'. Id.
48. See FERGUSSON, supra note 22, at C-3; see also Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (Aug.
19, 1994) (recognizing that the expiration of the EAA of 1979 "constitute[s] an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare[s] a national
emergency with respect to that threat").
49. See FERGUSSON, supra note 22, at C-3 (discussing the history and evolution of the EAA).
50. Id.; International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706 (2004).
51. Exec. Order No. 12,924, supra note 28.
52. EAR, supra note 7, § 730.2.
53. Id. § 730.5-6.
54. Corr, supra note 35, at 460.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 460-461.
57. See EAR, supra note 7, § 774 (providing the Commerce Control List).
58. See id. § 738 (2004 & Supp. 1 2004) (containing the Commerce Country Chart).
59. See Ronald J. Sievert, Urgent Message to Congress - Nuclear Triggers to Libya, Missile Guidance
to China, Air Defense to Iraq, Arms Suppliers to the World: Has the Time Finally Arrived to Overhaul the U.S.
Export Control Regime?-The Case for Immediate Reform of Our Outdated, Ineffective, and Self-Defeating
Export Control System, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 93 (2002) (describing the process by which U.S. exporters are
able to obtain licenses to export their dual-use goods to other countries).
437
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and the exporter must refer to other sections of the EAR to determine whether the
buyer is on a list of countries, organizations or individuals to which dual-use
exports are denied.60
Even if an exporter successfully completes the initial portion of the process,
there is still the possibility that the license will be denied if the Department of
Commerce believes that the end-use of the product is one on a specific list of
banned chemical, biological, or nuclear activities.61
If the exporter is able to meet all these requirements, the Department of
Commerce will typically determine which type of license for export to a specific
destination will be approved.62 A general license does not require further written
authorization or documentation from the Department of Commerce. Further, it is
available for any commodity listed on the CCL that is being exported to any
destination that does not require a validated license. 63 However, individual
validated licenses are required for specific commodities and technical data listed
on the CCL that are being exported to certain destinations, and must be
accompanied by additional supporting documentation.6
Once the export license is issued, the Department of Commerce is
responsible for conducting a post-shipment verification check to ensure the end-
user and end-use match those stated in the application for the export license.
This post-shipment verification is often minimal or absent.66
In addition to the EAA, which is an internal regulation on exports, the U.S.
also faces external constraints on exports.
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S LIMITATIONS ON EXPORT CONTROLS
A. From GAIT to the World Trade Organization
For decades, the United States has championed regulations to assure equal
treatment among international trading partners. In 1945, the United States
60. See id. (referring to the Commerce Control List).
61. See EAR, supra note 7, § 744 (including nuclear explosive activities, unsafe guarded nuclear
activities, restrictions on certain rocket systems, and restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons
end-uses, on the specific list of prohibited end-uses).
62. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 812 n. 2 (describing the difference between general and
validated licenses); see also Gaugh, supra note 19, at 56.
63. See Gaugh, supra note 19, at 56 (explaining the U.S. export licensing system).
64. Id.
65. See The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, U.S. General Accounting Office Report on
Export Controls (Jan. 2004) available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0401/doc25.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2004) [hereinafter GAO Report] (highlighting the findings of GAO-04-357, Export Controls: Post-Shipment
Verification Provides Limited Assurance That Dual-Use Items Are Being Properly Used, GAO Report to
Senator Jon Kyl).
66. The negative effects of this minimal or absent post-shipment verification are discussed in Part V.B.
of this comment.
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67
proposed a code of conduct for international trade, which was to be
administered by a new International Trade Organization ("ITO").68 This body
was intended to resolve disputes between signatories to the code and attend to
other administrative duties. 69 The main principles proposed for the code were
unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment and the prohibition of mostS • 70
quantitative trade restrictions among signatories.
To build support for an ITO, the United States brought together twenty-two
other countries in Geneva for tariff-cutting negotiations that ran from April to
October of 1947.71 These negotiations set the stage for future "Rounds," as they
became known, which played a prominent role in creating international trade
law.12 Similar to the most-favoured-nation principle, all negotiated concessions
were applied equally to the participants.73 The concessions were recorded in the
GATT, which also contained a code of conduct that protected these concessions
and committed all signatories to a common set of international trade behaviors .
The U.S. Congress later rejected a proposed charter for the ITO, that
consequently never actually came into existence.7 ' Thus, the United States
partially achieved its plan for an international trade law code of conduct, but
without full ratification, there was no governing body to enforce the code.76
GATT continued to evolve through additional negotiation rounds, patterned
after the initial Geneva Round.77 In 1982, the United States urged a new round of
negotiations to expand GATT's focus from trade in goods to include trade in• 71
services, intellectual property and investment. With much persistence on the
part of the United States,79 the Uruguay Round convened in 1986 and ran until
67. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFIELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 23 (2002) (discussing the U.S.
document entitled "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment" presented for consideration to




71. See id. at 24 (providing that the original countries to negotiate a multilateral trade agreement
included the United Kingdom, France, China, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, The
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, and Cuba, followed by an additional eight
countries who were engaged in a tariff-cutting negotiation).
72. Id. at 25.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Development of the World Trade Organization and the International
Criminal Court, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 743, 745 (2004) (noting that a familiar pattern repeated itself when the
United States rejected the ITO and other countries followed suit).
76. See LOWENFIELD, supra note 67, at 26 (noting that the ITO charter never entered into effect as most
governments waited for the United States before initiating ratification procedures).
77. See generally LOWENFIELD, supra note 67, at 46-47, 49, 54, 61 (2002) (discussing the several
Rounds of negotiation after Geneva); see also The Dates, Locations, and Main Purposes of GATT and WTO
Ministerial Conferences and Special Sessions, at http://www.sam.sdu.dk/undervis/ 90282.F04/Overheads/
GATT%20and%20WTO%20calendar.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (listing the dates of each of the Rounds).
78. See LOWENFIELD, supra note 67, at 61 (noting that the global economy had also evolved since the
original GATT, and these new areas of trade fit well within the principles and techniques of GATT).
79. See id. (describing how developing countries opposed the U.S. desire for a new round because the
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1994.8o It was from the Uruguay Round that a new international trade
organization emerged-the WTO.8' Even though GATT was never ratified, its
signatories applied it provisionally for almost fifty years until the founding of the
WTO . GATT now serves as the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods. 3 All
128 signatories of GATT were invited to ratify the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round and 127 nations became members of the newly formed WTO.84
B. "Most-Favoured-Nation" Principle
The "most-favoured-nation" principle is the foundation for WTO's
prohibition against discrimination among trading partners, and one of the original
principles upon which the United States based its initial proposal that evolved
into GATT.5 The principle declares that WTO member states86 cannot
discriminate between trading partners.87 The "most-favoured-nation" principle
was so important that it became the first article of GATT." Paragraph 1 of Article
I, covering the "most-favoured-nation" principle and export controls states that:
[w]ith respect to all rules and formalities in connection with exportation,
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.8 9
developing countries felt let down by the 1973 Tokyo Round and from the European Community "whose trade
officials feared that a new round would present a new opportunity to attack the Common Agricultural Policy").
80. Understanding the WTO, supra note 13, at 10.
81. Id.; see also LOWENFIELD, supra note 67, at 61 (noting that the newly formed WTO created the
permanent organization originally intended by the United States when it first proposed what later became the
GATT).
82. See Cone, supra note 75, at 745 (describing the diplomatic, and later legal, dispute resolution
process engaged in by the "contracting parties that had signed (but not ratified) this provisional agreement");
see also LOWENFIELD, supra note 67 at 26 (noting that "GATT 1947, conceived as a provisional agreement not
requiring parliamentary approval, remained in effect from January 1948 to January 1995").
83. Understanding the WTO, supra note 13, at 10.
84. See Final Act, supra note 12, at 1130 (explaining the procedure for becoming a member of the
WTO); see also World Trade Organization: The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/gattmem-e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (listing the 128 countries that
had signed GATT, including Zaire, which is not a current member of the World Trade Organization).
85. See LOWENFIELD, supra note 67, at 23.
86. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization - Members and
Observers (Oct. 13, 2004), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif.e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2005) [hereinafter WTO Members and Observers] (providing the list of the 148 Member Nations of the
VWTO and the 31 Observer Nations). All observer governments except the Holy See must start accession
negotiations within five years of becoming observers. Id.
87. Understanding the WTO, supra note 13, at 10.
88. GA7T, supra note 13, at Art. I; see also Understanding the VTO, supra note 13, at 10.
89. Gaugh, supra note 19, at 65.
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In this way, the language of GATT Article I illustrates the significance of the
"most-favoured-nation" principle.
While Article I forbids discrimination among WTO trading partners, it does
contain exceptions.9° One such exception, the national security exception of
Article XXI, allows contracting parties to discriminate against certain nations for
national security purposes, without violating GATT.9 This exception is discussed
in the following section of this comment.92
C. Article XXI Security Exception
A prominent exception to the "most-favoured-nation" clause is the ability of
member nations to protect their national security.93 Article XXI provides that an
agreement shall not (1) require disclosure of any information contrary to national
security interests, or (2) prevent necessary actions from being taken to protect
essential security interests, or (3) prevent any contracting party from pursuing
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security.94
This exception to the Article I "most-favoured-nation" clause allows
contracting parties to restrict trade for national security purposes without
violating GATT. 95 The national security exception is critical to WTO members
attempting to balance the need to protect their national security with their
obligations to the WTO.96 The Article XXI exception attempts to confine trade
restrictions to situations that the contracting party "considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests. 97
There are no absolute standards for determining whether a WTO member's
invocation of Article XXI is truly for an essential security interest. One group of
legal experts argues that the intent of Article XXI is clearly subjective, and it is
left to the member state to determine the need for invocation.9 s Other legal
experts argue for an objective standard that is more limiting.99
90. See id. at 66 (stating that "most exceptions to Article I are related to imports rather than exports" and
are listed in Articles VI, XII, XIV, XX, and XXI).
91. GATT, supranote 13, at Art. XXI.
92. See discussion infra Part II.C.
93. GATT, supra note 13, at Art. XXI.
94. Id.
95. Gaugh, supra note 19, at 67.
96. See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security
Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty
and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 417 (2001) (discussing that nations do not want to participate in
agreements without assurances that they retain "the right to protect their sovereignty from external threat").
97. LOWENFIELD, supra note 67, at 34.
98. See id. (stating that Article XXI is a self-judging measure making it a "significant means for evading
GATT obligations); see also Cone, supra note 75, at 745 (arguing that the Article XXI exception is quite broad
and does not prevent contracting parties from self-judging their need for the exception, but also noting that the
exception has not been abused).
99. See Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What the
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The drafters of GATT limited the exception to essential security interests
because they did not want the exception to completely obviate the purposes of
GATT.'0° The drafters did not want to make the exception too "tight" so as to
prohibit "measures which are needed purely for security reasons," but at the same
time, they did not want to make the exception so "broad" that countries could
pursue commercial purposes disguised as an essential security interest. '° '
However, since the adoption of GATT, member nations have affirmed their right
to invoke the Article XXI "essential security interest" exception without
justification or the approval of other members. 0 2 Further, there is even
controversy surrounding the extent to which a country must notify other WTO
members that it has chosen to invoke the exception.0 3
Concerns that the national security exception could "reopen the door to
arbitrary abuse" of economic power' have been "checked informally" in several
instances. '°, In fact, in several instances member nations used persuasive
methods, rather than turning to the WTO, to settle export disputes.'" In this way,
the objective/subjective ambiguity of Article XXI promotes informal resolution
of export disagreements, and supports liberal and most-favoured-nation trade
policies, while still responding to members' legitimate security concerns. The
United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 268-275 (1998) (contending that Article XXI should be an
objective test based on whether "a reasonable government faced with the same circumstances would invoke
Article XXI"); see also Rene E. Browne, Comment, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdependent
World: The GATT Article XXI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L. J. 405, 421 (1997) (arguing that "a
history of insistence upon the 'self-defining' nature of Article XXI by biased parties to disputes, without a
definitive statement or interpretation by the contracting parties as a whole, however, does not dictate that the
provision must be understood as self-defining").
100. See Gaugh, supra note 19, at 67 (noting that the particular wording of the Article XXI exception
"was chosen, after considerable discussion, because the drafters of Article XXI wanted to limit the exception to
prevent it from swallowing the entire GATT").
101. See id. at 67-68 (quoting the drafters' reasoning in choosing the Article XXI language).
102. See id. at 68 (explaining that through the life of GATT, contracting parties have widely asserted
that their use of the exception is by right and therefore requires no "notification, justification [or] approval").
103. See David T. Shapiro, Be Careful What You Wish For: U.S. Politics and the Future of the National
Security Exception to the GA77, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 97, 102-103 (1997) (noting that, in the
1982 situation where "the European Community, Canada, and Australia suspended imports from Argentina in
retaliation for Argentina's attack on the Falkland Islands, citing Article XXI," it was decided that members
invoking the national security exception must inform other contracting parties of the invocation "to the fullest
extent possible").
104. See id. at 101 (quoting Professor John H. Jackson, in his book WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT at 752 (1969)).
105. See Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1312 (2003) (providing examples of such informal checks on the national security exception).
For example, the GATT community persuaded Sweden to withdraw its national security protection over shoes.
Id. It also persuaded Taiwan not to invoke the exception in connection with the accession of the People's
Republic of China to the WTO. Id. Additionally, Columbia and Nicaragua submitted their border dispute to the
International Court of Justice instead of arguing the matter in the WTO and the United States and the European
Community reached a settlement in their dispute over the Helms-Burton Act, rather than arguing the matter in
the WTO. Id.
106. Id.
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ambiguity in Article XXI allows "countries the ability to respond to legitimate
security concerns without destroying advances in trade liberalization."'
' 7
IV. DOES THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT VIOLATE GATT?
The alignment of the U.S. EAA and GATT becomes problematic because of
the overlap in the list of countries to which U.S. businesses export dual-use
technology and the list of countries that are members of the WTO. When U.S.
businesses export to any country, WTO member or not, they are subject to U.S.
export requirements. Contained within EAR section 740, Supp. 1, is a list entitled
Country Group D, 0 8 containing all the countries to which the United States
restricts export licenses under the EAR for national security reasons.'" Of the
forty-six countries on the Group D list, fourteen are WTO members and nine are
WTO observer governments."0 Since the United States, and not U.S. businesses,
was the actual signatory to GATT, the businesses themselves are not subject to
GATT Article I and can, therefore, discriminate between trading partners as they
choose."' However, any discriminatory restrictions the United States places upon
business exports are subject to GATT obligations."'
In order for such restrictions to be acceptable under GATT, they must be
necessary for the protection of the essential security interests of the United
States.' While the EAA is clear about restrictions on the export of dual-use
technology for national security reasons, other categories of restrictions in the
EAA - "nuclear," "chemical & biological," and "missile technology" - do not
specifically state they may be restricted for security reasons."'4 This ambiguity
has resulted in controversy over whether or not "nuclear", "chemical &
biological", and "missile technology" fit within the GATT Article XXI national
security exception.'
107. Id. at 1310.
108. See EAR, supra note 7, § 740, Supp. I (containing Country Groups A-D which are used in 15
C.F.R. § 740 to indicate which countries are restricted from receiving licenses for particular goods and
technologies).
109. Id.
110. See id. (listing the countries restricted for national security reasons); see also WTO Members and
Observers, supra note 86 (listing all WTO members and observer governments). The WTO members in
Country Group D are: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China (PRC), Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macau, Moldova, Mongolia, and Romania. The WTO observer governments in Country
Group D are: Iraq, Kazakhstan, Laos, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Id.
111. See GATT, supra note 13, at Preface (stating that the governments of the member nations agree to
the provisions of GATT).
112. Id. (noting that the United States is a signatory to GATT and is therefore required to observe GATT
procedures).
113. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXI(a)-(b) (allowing for WTO member nations to avoid their
obligations if necessary for an "essential security interest").
114. EAR, supra note 7, § 740, Supp. 1.
115. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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The attacks on the United States on September 1 1th, 2001, created a new
domestic awareness of the global threat of terrorism and the susceptibility of the
United States. This new awareness also shifted the U.S. perception of what
export controls were necessary for the protection of the "essential security
interests" of the United States. 116
A. Arguments Against the EAA's Legality Pre-9/ll
Prior to September 11, 2001, three arguments that the EAA did not conform
to GATT were advanced."' First, there were no findings that export controls were
necessary for the protection of the essential security interests of the United
States."'s Second, within the structure of the EAA, "most proliferation controls
[were] categorized primarily as foreign policy controls, rather than national
security controls."".9 Third, the Department of Commerce failed to note that
certain technologies on the Commerce Control List were controlled for both
national security and proliferation reasons, even though they had done so for
other technologies.'20 In essence, commentators worried that the United States
might use national security as justification for political motives in regulating
exports. This would make the "most-favoured-nation" principle practically
worthless by allowing WTO member nations to disguise politically motivated
discrimination by claiming it was necessary to protect their "essential security
interests."
B. Reconsidering These Arguments Post-9/11
While the words "necessary for the protection of the essential security
interests of the United States" are not specifically stated in the EAA, Congress
does offer two reasons why the EAA is necessary for the protection of essential
116. Id.
117. Gaugh, supra note 19, at 73-74 (concluding that the EAA violated GATT).
118. See id. at 73 (noting however that "the absence of the particular language found in GATT Article
XXI is certainly not determinative. Thus, there is only a weak prima facie case that the EAA violates GAIT,
because it fails to comply fully with Article XXI. This lack is more likely indicative of American indifference
towards compliance with GAIT.").
119. See id. (noting that because national security and foreign policy controls are within different
sections of the Statute, and not subsets of one another, "the inclusion of missile technology and biological and
chemical weapons in the foreign policy provisions of the EAA strongly indicates that Congress did not feel that
these controls were of a national security nature.").
120. See id. at 73-74 (arguing that such failure to note that a given technology is controlled for both
national security and proliferation reasons "in a number of proliferation controls is strong evidence that they
have been imposed for reasons other than protecting the essential security interests of the United States").
121. See id. (suggesting that the overarching national security rationale is actually based on foreign
policy, not national security).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 18
security interests.' Outlined in the Introduction of the EAA of 1979, these
findings are:
(5) Exports of goods or technology without regard to whether they make
a significant contribution to the military potential of individual countries
or combinations of countries may adversely affect the national security
of the United States.
23
(8) It is important that the administration of export controls imposed for
national security purposes give special emphasis to the need to control
exports of technology (and goods which contribute significantly to the
transfer of such technology) which could make a significant contribution
to the military potential of any country or combination of countries
which would be detrimental to the national security of the United
States.'24
Although Congress chose to use the phrases "adversely affect the national
security of the United States" and "detrimental to the national security of the
United States" instead of "necessary for the protection of the essential security
interests of the United States," the language provides essentially the same
meaning. Therefore, the EAA does not violate GATT based on the language used
in the statute, because it is merely a question of semantics; any of these terms
indicate a clear intention on the part of the United States to protect their national
security interests. '
The second argument, that "most proliferation controls are categorized
primarily as foreign policy controls rather than national security controls," falls
short when one considers U.S. foreign policy.'26 A current U.S. foreign policy
strategy uses export controls to persuade other countries to take immediate steps
to prevent the use of their territories or resources to aid, encourage, or give
sanctuary to those persons involved in any way in acts of international
terrorism. 27 Before the President imposes export controls, he is required to
exhaust reasonable and prompt efforts to secure the removal or reduction of
assistance to international terrorists through international cooperation and
agreement. 28 These EAA regulations preclude arbitrary restrictions on trade. In
122. EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2401.
123. Id. § 2401(5).
124. Id. § 2401(8).
125. See Gaugh, supra note 19, at 73 (noting that "the absence of the particular language found in
GATT Article XXI is certainly not determinative"). Therefore, the argument that the EAA violates GATT
because it fails to comply fully with Article XXI is weak. More likely, this compliance failure is due to
American indifference towards compliance with GAT'. Id.
126. Id. at 73-74.
127. EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2402(8).
128. Id.
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light of the recent terrorist attacks on the United States,' 29 foreign policy and
national security are arguably so intertwined that they cannot be separated in
preventing international terrorism.'3 °
The confluence of foreign policy and national security also impacts export
limitations of nuclear, chemical and biological, and missile technology, which
fall under "foreign policy" restrictions under the EAA."'' But after 9/11, these
technologies pose potential security risks to the nation. In 2003, the U.S.
Department of State forewarned that while terrorists would likely still rely upon
traditional terrorist tactics, several terrorist groups might look to nuclear,
chemical and biological materials as a means to cause mass casualties rivaling or
exceeding those of September 1 lth.13 2 In addition, the United Nations Security
Council issued a resolution affirming that the proliferation of these materials
"constitutes a threat to international peace and security.' 33 Considering the
international consensus that these materials pose a serious security risk, arguing
that the United States cannot limit exports of nuclear, chemical, biological or
missile technologies because they fall within the wrong section of the EAA
ignores the safety of our people.
As part of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. government restricts the exportation
of nuclear, chemical, biologic and missile technologies to ten WTO members and
five WTO observer govemments.' 3 Some of the countries to which the United
States restricts exports have volatile governments and have either associated with
terrorists or they are terrorist sympathizers; included in this group of countries
are Afghanistan, India, Libya, and Pakistan.3 s In light of the countries' tenuous
relationships, the United States has restricted the export of technologies or
materials that could be used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction,
129. See Pate, supra note 18 (describing the events of September 11, 2001).
130. See Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Three Years of Progress in the
War on Terror [hereinafter Fact Sheet] available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/
2004091 1.html (Sept. 11, 2004) (quoting President George W. Bush as saying, ".. [O]ur country is safer than it
was on September the 11th, 2001, yet, we're still not safe.... We are a Nation in danger. We're doing
everything we can in our power to confront the danger. We're making good progress in protecting our people
and bringing our enemies to account. But one thing is for certain: We'll keep our focus and we'll keep our
resolve and we will do our duty to best secure our country.") The President talks of defeating "the terrorist
enemy" as necessary to "protect the American people," thus indicating it is a matter of national security. Id.
131. EAR, supra note 7, § 740, Supp. 1.
132. See U.S. Dept. of State, PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM at 87 (2003) available at http://www.
state.gov/documents/ organization/31912.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. Dept. of State] (noting
that September 11 th confirmed that terrorists will use mass casualties to serve their purposes and that
troublesome amounts of nuclear, chemical and biological materials, and information remain available to these
terrorists).
133. Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, 4956th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1540 (2004), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1540%
20(2004)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
134. Id.; see also WTO Members and Observers, supra note 86 (listing the WTO member nations and
observer governments). The WTO members restricted are: Bahrain, Egypt, India, Israel, Jordon, Kuwait, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The WTO observer governments restricted are: Afghanistan,
Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Id.
135. Id.
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appearing much less foreign policy oriented and much more national security
oriented.
For example, Pakistan has not been a threat to the United States since 9/11. '36
In fact, Pakistan has assisted the United States in its War on Terror, even going
so far as to provide bases for the U.S. Air Force during the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan.'37 However, it is predominantly Pakistan's leadership that is friendly
to the United States, with much of the Pakistani government personnel and
general population opposed to an alliance with the United States.'3 s Moreover, the
Taliban, taken out of power when the United States invaded Afghanistan,
originated in Pakistan. 139 Pakistan also sheltered Osama bin Laden, one terrorist
believed to be responsible for planning the attacks of September 1 1th.'40 The
precarious nature of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan
justifies export restrictions against Pakistan for essential security interests.
Furthermore, Pakistan and India are permanently pitted against each other in
a nuclear arms race.'4 ' Neither has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, and each links its own signing to the signing of the other.'42 During the
Clinton Administration, India emerged as a nuclear threat to the United States.
In response to India's 1998 nuclear testing, the United States imposed sanctions
on India, including termination of dual-use technology sales.' 4 These sanctions
were fully lifted by President George W. Bush following the September 1lth
attacks and as a result Indo-American relations improved such that India offered
air bases for use by the United States in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.'
4
However, constructive Indo-American relations are still in the early stages, and
136. My Enemy's Enemy, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 39 (referring to the friendly and helpful
relationship Pakistan has had with the United States post-9/1 1).
137. Id.
138. See Graham Allison, Tick, Tick, Tick, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2004, at 58 (noting that
Pakistan's President Musharraf has pledged support to the U.S. fight against terrorism, but not all of Pakistan's
military and intelligence agencies, or Pakistan's general population support the alliance with the United States).
139. Rathnan Indurthy, India and the Clinton-Bush Administrations, WORLD AFFAIRS, Summer 2002,
at 3.
140. See id. (describing the Taliban's involvement in the U.S. search for Osama bin Laden).
141. See Mark Thompson, Jay Branegan, Massimo Calabresi, James Carney, Michael Duffy, Matthew
Forney, Paul Quinn-Judge, and Thomas Sanction, The Secretary of Missile Defense, TIME EUROPE, May 14,
2001, at 26 (noting that an Indian buildup in nuclear weapons would trigger a Pakistani buildup in nuclear
weapons).
142. See Indurthy, supra note 139 (noting that Pakistan links its signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty to India signing the treaty, thus creating the current stalemate situation of neither country signing the
treaty and neither country wanting to be the first to do so); see also The Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Status of Signature and Ratification, at http://www.
ctbto.org/s-r/sigrat.dhtmlrat=NA&sig+NA&wcstate=ALL&showsig=YES&showrat=YES&region=ALL (last
visited on Feb. 13, 2005) (noting that India and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified the treaty).
143. See Indurthy, supra note 139 (noting that President Clinton was joined by administration officials
and U.S. Congressional leaders in denouncing India's nuclear testing).
144. Id.
145. See id. (noting that the United States chose Pakistan for its frontline country of defense rather than
using India).
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until the United States and India have a longer history of mutual collaboration,
export restrictions against India for nuclear reasons fall within essential security
interests.
A third reason why U.S. foreign policy and national security are inseparable
is Libya-a country with a long history of terrorist activities. '46 Two examples are
illustrative. The Libyan government has officially accepted responsibility for the
actions of its officials in connection with the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, and
the Qadhafi Foundation has pledged compensation to the victims wounded in the
1986 bombing of a Berlin nightclub that was orchestrated by the Libyan
intelligence service.4 7 Although Libya has taken steps to aid the United States in
the War on Terror by sharing intelligence on terrorist organizations, and has
officially renounced terrorism, Libya still remains on the U.S. State Department's
list of countries that sponsor terrorism.'48 Because Libya remains a terrorism
concern, export control restrictions aimed at Libya fall within the essential
security interests of the United States.
Because both Pakistan and Libya pose terrorist threats, either from
individuals within the country or from its national leaders, the threat provides a
rationale for controlling export licenses for nuclear, chemical and biological, and
missile technologies. The reasons for controlling these technologies are not listed
specifically in the EAA as national security reasons, which is why critics frame
them as foreign policy motivations. However, the security threat posed by this
group of countries supports restrictions of such exports as being necessary to
protect the "essential security interests" of the United States, as required by the
GATT Article XXI national security exception.
The final pre-9/11 argument that the EAA violates GATT is that the
Department of Commerce has failed to note that certain technologies on the
Commerce Control List are controlled for both national security and proliferation
reasons, even though they have done so for other technologies.49 Under this
argument, omission of these technologies is construed to be intentional: the
framers of the EAA did not intend that these potentially dangerous materials
should be restricted on solely foreign policy grounds. On the other hand, as
discussed above, the definitions of foreign policy and national security overlap
more in the post-9/1 1 era than before, due to the threat of terrorism.'5° In the
event this overlap does not meet GATT requirements, the United States sought
export controls to punish states that support terrorism. While these efforts have
146. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 132, at 91 (detailing Libya's terrorist history and discussing
Libya's recent renunciation of terrorism).
147. Id. (discussing Libya's current attempt to resurrect itself in the eyes of the international
community).
148. Id. at 85, 91 (recognizing the proactive and positive efforts of the Libyan government in signing
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, but continuing to list Libya as a state sponsor of
terrorist activities).
149. Gaugh, supra note 19, at 73-74.
150. Fact Sheet, supra note 130.
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generally failed to reach accord, they have not been challenged as violating
GATT.
15 1
As one commentator proposes, "the WTO should follow the original
interpretation of Article XXI, which permitted trade sanctions only in the face of
threats to national security in time of war or other emergency.""'5 In the days
following 9/11, President George W. Bush declared a global War on Terror.
Even if he has declared that the War in Iraq is over, there is little doubt that a
time of emergency continues.'53 Thus, because they relate to essential U.S.
security interests, any trade sanctions created by the EAA during this time of war
or emergency are allowed under a strict reading of the Article XXI exception.
However, even if the EAA is determined to be consistent with GATT, its
effectiveness remains in question.
V. THE EFFICACY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EAA
A. Challenge of Foreign Availability
Although the EAA may not violate WTO obligations, curtailing U.S. exports
still may not be rational if excluded nations can purchase dual-use technology
from another foreign nation.5 4 For example, Germany's Siemens Corporation
sold krypton electric switches to Iraq.' 5 While commonly used by doctors to
destroy kidney stones, these switches can also be used to set off the chain
reaction in nuclear weapons.'56 After the War in Iraq ended, U.S. troops found an
unexpected amount of dual-use items that had been exported from other foreign
nations, including assortments of French military equipment and German-made
chemical weapon protective gear."'
The EAA acknowledges the issue of foreign availability, and therefore, lays
out the following procedure: If the Secretary of Commerce determines that
availability from non-U.S. sources makes restrictions on the export license of a
151. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 812 n. 5.
152. See Shapiro, supra note 103, at 113 (indicating that "[u]nder this definition the United States could
only sanction its wartime enemies, nations that support such enemies, and nations that use indirect means to
undermine U.S. national security").
153. See Dana Bash et al., Bush Warns War on Terror Not Over (May 2, 2003), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLMCS/05/02/spj.irq.bush.ahead/index.html (reporting that the President
warned his audience that the war against terror might not be over and that '"[any person involved in
committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy of this country and a
target of American justice").
154. See FERGUSSON, supra note 22, at CRS-5 (noting that "[floreign availability exists when a good is
available to controlled countries from sources outside the United States in 'sufficient quantity and comparable
quality' so that control of the item would be ineffective.").
155. William Safire, Selling Our Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at A6.
156. Id.
157. Nathan T.H. Lloyd, Rebuilding a Broken Regime: Restructuring the Export Administration Act, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 305 (2004).
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certain good ineffective, then the Secretary will approve all licenses for that good
that meet license requirements. "' The Secretary shall also remove the good or
technology from the CCL if it is determined to be the appropriate action. '59
While the Secretary of Commerce is responsible for determining on a
continuing basis whether foreign availability exists, either the Secretary of
Commerce can initiate an investigation or the license applicant can request such
an investigation.' 6 Therefore, if the Secretary of Commerce is not updating the
CCL on a continuing basis, license applicants provide an additional check on the
system to ensure efficacy. This further ensures that license restrictions are
"necessary," since only materials that are unavailable from other countries would
remain on the CCL. As per the Article XXI exception, those exports are
legitimately restricted.'
61
By ensuring that dual-use technology is not available from another country,
the U.S. guarantees that its export controls are truly necessary to protect its
"essential security interests" because it is the only source for such technology. In
the event the President chooses to overturn a decision by the Secretary of
Commerce and to control an item because to do otherwise "would be detrimental
to the national security of the United States," the President must enter into
negotiations with multilateral control partners to eliminate the availability at
issue.' 62 Such multilateral negotiations would bring to light disagreements with
other countries about the imperative for U.S. restrictions, providing yet another
safeguard to ensure necessity of the essential security control.
The issue of foreign availability invites at least two additional perspectives.
On one hand, there is a moral argument that the United States can protect
national security by controlling the export of dangerous technologies, and should
not surrender efforts to control dual-use items.' 63 On the other hand, this
argument ignores the issue of illegal foreign availability. For instance, in 2003 it
was discovered that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear-
weapons program, had been running a black market network of nuclear
technologies and knowledge." For more than a decade, this nuclear smuggling
network supplied the means to make enriched uranium to Iran, Libya and North
158. EAA of 1979, supra note 6.
159. Id.
160. FERGUSSON, supra note 22, at CRS-5,6.
161. GATT, supra note 13, at Art. XXI.
162. FERGUSSON, supra note 22, at CRS-6.
163. See Lloyd, supra note 157, at 309 (taking the side that U.S. businesses are not punished because if
there truly was foreign availability, enemies of the United States would not attempt to gain dual-use items from
the United States and that regardless of foreign availability, the United States should not just give up and hand
the items over).
164. See Allison, supra note 138, at 58 (noting that while Khan asserted there was never any
government authorization for his activities and Pakistan's President Musharraf has pledged support to the U.S.
fight against terrorism, not all of Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies, or Pakistan's general population
support the alliance with the United States).
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Korea.'65 All of these countries are on the U.S. Department of State's list of
countries who sponsor terrorism. 66 In addition, nuclear sites in Russia and other
former Soviet states remain vulnerable to theft because their security systems
have not been upgraded.' 67 These real examples illustrate that terrorists can obtain
dual-use items regardless of export regulation and agreements between countries.
A second perspective comes from U.S. industries, who argue that foreign
availability, coupled with "tight restrictions and long waits for licenses merely
punish U.S. businesses without preventing enemies from gaining access to the
items they seek.' ' 168 Further, U.S. industry argues that the loss of income resulting
from U.S. export controls hampers domestic businesses from researching and
developing new technologies.69 Foreign firms are advantaged because they can
use their increased capital to invest in research and development of new
technologies that may allow them to surpass the United States in the technology
race. 7° This in turn will put the United States at a national security disadvantage
when foreign nations become more technologically capable than the United
States, rather than protecting security interests as intended.
B. Further Efficacy Challenges with Post-Shipment Verification
Even without the added complication of foreign availability, the actual
application of the EAA decreases its desired policy outcome of keeping dual-use
items out of the hands of those who harbor ill will toward the United States. 17,
The EAR prohibits exports of dual-use items based on the identity of the end-
user or end-use, but the Department of Commerce fails to adequately monitor the
actual end-use and end-users of the exported items.7 2 Once an export license is
issued, the Department of Commerce is responsible for conducting a post-
shipment verification check to ensure the end-user and end-use match those
stated in the application for the export license. 173 Even though twenty-eight
165. Amy Klamper, Hunter Urges Technology Export Controls Be Strengthened, CONGRESS DAILY,
Mar. 17, 2004, at 6.
166. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 132 (providing an overview of state-sponsored terrorism).
167. See Jessica Stem, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 27, 40 (arguing that
"Western governments must make it harder for radicals to get their hands on [new weapons]").
168. Id.; see also FERGUSON, supra note 22, at CRS-13 (noting that industry argues that "countries of
concern" will simply turn to other nations to obtain the technology, thereby disadvantaging U.S. businesses
while allowing foreign businesses to increase their market share and explore new markets).
169. FERGUSON, supra note 22, at CRS-16 (noting that the loss of income from these exports reduces the
amount of money U.S. businesses have to invest in future research and development which is necessary to
remain competitive in the world market).
170. See id.
171. GAO Report, supra note 65 (referring to the failure to properly implement post-shipment
verification procedures).
172. Lloyd, supra note 157, at 313-314. The Department of Commerce monitors dual-use exports
through the Bureau of Industry and Security. Id.
173. GAO Report, supra note 65.
2005 / Controlling the Export of Dual- Use Technology in a Post-9/1 1 World
percent of all approved licenses for dual-use exports are to countries of
concern,' 74 the Department of Commerce only completed post-shipment
verification checks on six percent of these licenses.' In addition, when post-
shipment verification checks are actually completed, unfavorable results do not
necessarily prevent companies from receiving export licenses in the future, nor
do they play a major role in future enforcement actions. 76 Therefore, a lack of
real enforcement of the dual-use export license conditions regarding end-users
and end-uses allows dual-use items to fall into the hands of parties who would
otherwise be unable to obtain these items from the United States.
C. Effects of Licensing Processing Disparities on U.S. Businesses
The United States is placed in a negative competition environment when
other WTO members process orders for dual-use technology more rapidly and
predictably. 77 One chief executive officer revealed, "our solution is to import a
lot of equipment from Europe [rather than the U.S.].. .the export license usually
takes from one week to two weeks for a European government. For the USA, [it
is] case by case. Sometimes [it is] three months, but the longest we have
experienced is six months.' 7'  Daimler Chrysler Aerospace instructs its
purchasing managers not to rely upon American parts because of the delays
associated with American licensing. 79 Even though the most frequently listed
destination on export-license applications is China, post-9/11 U.S. security
policies have slowed down the approval process for exports to China due to
increased scrutiny of the applications."0 This increased scrutiny puts U.S.
companies at a disadvantage to their international competitors who have not
chosen to increase their control efforts.'8 '
Even among U.S. businesses, the EAA procedures create a disadvantage.
82
Large companies can afford auxiliary staff to decipher the regulatory
requirements.' However, small companies cannot afford the added expense of
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176. See id. (noting that these weaknesses in the post-shipment verification process reduce the process'
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182. Lloyd, supra note 157, at 310.
183. Id.
452
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 18
specialized staff. Small companies are therefore not able to compete at the same
level in the exportation of dual-use technology.
4
The theory of regulatory accretion predicts this competitive disadvantage.
8
1
The theory states that the more complex the system of rules, the more the system
places burdens on compliance.' 86 The increased compliance effort results in a
decrease in the desired policy outcome.'87 The solution to this problem is
regulatory reinvention. 11 Under the theory of regulatory accretion and
reinvention, the Department of Commerce must continue to remain flexible and
simplify the EAA so that regulations can effectively keep dual-use items out of
terrorist hands, while not destroying the very economic and social structure in the
United States that they were designed to protect.' 89
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to September 11, 2001, a case could be made that the EAA violated
GATT because necessity for national security was solely in the eyes of the
United States, independent of the judgment of other GATT members, and
because the Department of Commerce often controlled dual-use goods within the
CCL differently across nations. '90 In the wake of September 11 th, and in the
midst of the current War on Terror, the line between foreign policy interests and
national security interests has blurred.'9 ' While controlling international terrorism
was once deemed a foreign policy interest,'92 the U.S. has now felt the impact of
terrorism on its own soil, making counterterrorism a national security interest. In
addition, congressional findings in the EAA support the necessity to protect
essential security interests. '93 Taken together, protecting the United States against
terrorist attacks is now both a foreign policy interest as well as a national security
interest, satisfying the requirements of the Article XXI exception. Therefore, the
EAA, which controls the export of dual-use technology from the United States,
does not violate the WTO's most-favoured-nation principle because it falls
within the Article XXI exception-it is necessary to the essential security
interests of the U.S. during the War on Terror.
184. Id.
185. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion
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However, while the EAA does not violate the WTO's most-favoured-nation
principle, it is not effective in its application due to the problem of foreign
availability of dual-use technology.' 94 There are procedural safeguards written
into the EAA to ensure that foreign availability is taken into account when
updating the CCL,'95 but this procedure does not take into account black-market
smuggling between foreign nations and terrorists.96 In addition, even when a
license is approved under the EAA, the post-shipment verification checks on
exports to countries of concern are rarely performed, allowing approved exports
to fall into terrorist hands even when the item is exported from the United
States."
Not only is the EAA lacking effectiveness, it also puts U.S. companies at a
competitive disadvantage against foreign companies with less stringent
government export regulations.'98 Further, for U.S. businesses, the complicated
procedures detailed in the EAA put small companies at a competitive
disadvantage to large companies that can afford to hire the additional staff to
untangle these complex requirements.'9 9
The EAA does not violate the WTO's most-favoured-nation principle in this
post-9/11 War on Terror. However, to be both an effective national security
measure and comply with the WTO obligations, legal and illegal foreign
availability issues and post-shipment verification checks must be addressed.
Without regulatory reinvention, U.S. businesses and jobs will be threatened in the
name of a national security that is already vulnerable to competitive foreign
exports of dual-use technology and the EAA may cease to be a useful regulation.
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